The regulation of equities trading in Kuwait over the period from 1983 to 2011 is documented in this paper. An eclectic approach has resulted in overlapping responsibilities for the three main regulatory and supervisory bodies. Regulation appears to be responsive to market crises. As a result, regulations have tended to change with market conditions. Kuwaiti accounting and auditing requirements are also reviewed. The institutional setting in Kuwait has a number of implications for capital market based research. Informational inefficiency precludes research that relies on the assumption that security price reflects firm value. Other features (including the profit requirement, lock up restrictions and the two auditor rule) provide opportunities for capital market research in Kuwait.
Introduction
The focus of this paper is the regulation of equities trading in Kuwait. Equities are currently traded on the official market -the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) or on the 'parallel market' which facilitates the trading of companies that cannot meet the listing requirements of the main board of the KSE. Increasingly, capital markets researchers are finding that institutional features of markets impact on the applicability of theories developed in different markets provide both challenges and opportunities for research. Therefore, this paper contributes to the developing literature based in Kuwaiti financial markets by documenting changing regulations relevant to equities trading over the last three decades.
The history of regulation of equities trading in Kuwait is largely characterised as 'regulation in response to crises'. Therefore, the first section of this paper outlines significant economic events to contextualise the discussion of regulation in section 4. A brief overview of the types of equities that trade on the KSE is presented in section 3. Institutional arrangements for the accounting and auditing profession are discussed in section 5. The paper concludes with some implications of Kuwaiti institutional for accounting and finance research.
Kuwait Stock Exchange and Major Events
The Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE) ranks first in the Arab world based on turnover ratio, second in stockvalue traded, and third in market capitalization (Aldaihani and Aldeehani, 2008) . The public corporation has a relatively short history in Kuwait compared with western economies. Al-Yaqout (2006) identifies the discovery of oil, the subsequent influx of revenue and the Kuwaiti government's recognition of the benefits of corporate structures developing the economy as the critical factors in the emergence of the corporation in Kuwait. The National Bank of Kuwait, established in 1952, became the country's first public company (Al-Sultan, 1989, Bley and Chen, 2006) . The major events relevant to regulatory changes discussed are the 1976-1977 crisis, the AlManakh crisis, the Gulf War, the boom of [2003] [2004] [2005] and the global financial crisis.
The inception of corporate regulation and the 1976-77 crisis
The Commercial Companies Law (No.15), the first legislation to organise and regulate companies in Kuwait, was promulgated in 1960. However, the first significant step toward regulating domestic securities trading did not occur until the introduction of Law No.32 in 1970 (Al-Yaqout, 2006; Alanezi, 2006) . Law No.32 created a consultation committee to supervise trading, designed the stock market framework, attempted to protect the economy from stock price volatility, and provided for the assessment of foreign companies seeking to register their shares in the market. Stock trading on the exchange commenced in 1977 (Gombers et al., 2008; Masih et al., 2010) .
The Kuwaiti stock market was characterized by a rise in speculative activities in the 1970s (Hassan et al., 2003) as large numbers of inexperienced investors enthusiastically entered the market (AlYaqout, 2006; Alanezi, 2006) . This rise in speculative trading was fuelled by the "forward method", which allowed traders to use post-dated cheques to settle payments (Al-Qenae, 2000; AlYaqout, 2006; Alanezi, 2006) . Effectively, shares were purchased at multiples of the current price with deferred settlement (Al-Sultan, 1989 ) and lack of funds to invest was no impediment to trading. Combined with a lack of sufficient regulation, these features provided scope for key investors to manipulate the market for short-term gains during this period (Al-Qenae, 2000) .
By late 1976, the rapid rise in trading activity and huge inflation of share prices contributed to a calamitous market collapse. Demand from investors fell as stock prices rose and the widespread use of the "forward method" of settlement created significant levels of debt for investors (Al-Yaqout, 2006), the clearing system was inadequate and the organization of the stock market remained poor (Al-Qenae, 2000; Al-Yaqout, 2006; Alanezi, 2006) . By the end of 1977, stocks prices had fallen sharply and trading volume dropped 66% compared with the previous year (Al-Sultan, 1989; Al-Yaqout, 2006). In response to the collapse, the government placed a moratorium on the establishment of any new local shareholding companies or new equity raisings by existing companies from 1977 to 1979 (Al-Sultan, 1989).
The Al-Manakh crisis, 1982
As the investment opportunity set for Kuwaiti investors was constrained by the ban on new shareholding companies and new equity issues by existing companies, 'Gulf shareholding companies' provided popular investment vehicles. These Gulf companies were effectively owned by Kuwaiti investors but were incorporated in the Gulf Emirates (Al-Sultan, 1989) and, as such, were prohibited from trading on the official Kuwaiti market (Al-Qenae, 2000). The Kuwaiti over-the-counter (OTC) or 'AlManakh Stock Market' developed to trade Gulf companies (Elshamy and Al-Qenae, 2005 ) and unlisted Kuwaiti Closed Shareholding Companies (Al-Sultan, 1989 ). This unregulated market was popular with investors, generating four times the trading volume of the official market and double the equity base of the official market (Al-Sultan, 1989) . After a meteoric rise, the OTC index fell by 45% in the six months to August 1982 (Al-Sultan 1989).
Investors once again failed to cover their post-dated cheques and the OTC market collapsed (Oxford Business Group, 2006b).
Analysts agree that the failure of the OTC market, known as the 'Al-Manakh crisis' was caused by inadequate government regulation, insufficient financial disclosure, frivolous speculation, the use of post-dated cheques, and lack of government control over Gulf shareholding companies (Al-Mutairi, 2004). The crisis precipitated the Ameri Decree which reorganised the Kuwaiti stock market as an independent financial institution guided by an executive administration and a Market Committee to protect investors, issuers, and brokers (Oxford Business Group, 2006a). The KSE was then established and trading commenced in 1984 (KSE, 2010a). Regulators tightened market controls by stiffening listing requirements (Alsalman, 2002) . As a result, the numbers of new listings, shares issued, and stockbrokers were limited. Numerous regulations were also promulgated to bolster investors' confidence in the market (Al-Qenae, 2000) and the government spent many years trying to control debt and scheduling settlements for outstanding post-dated cheques after the Al-Manakh crisis.
The Gulf War, 1990-1991
The invasion of Kuwait was a major shock to the nation and to its economic system. The massive destruction that followed changed the development path of the Kuwaiti economy (International Monetary Fund, 2005 ). An unfortunate implication for research is that much historical data were lost, constraining the sampling timeframe for Kuwaiti market research.
The post-war period in Kuwait was a challenging one. Economic performance suffered greatly in the 1990s, and the KSE was closed from August 1990 to September 1992 (Annual Economic Report of the KSE, 1990/1991). After reopening, the KSE struggled to rebuild investor confidence and stock market activity remained sluggish. The Kuwait Automated Trading System (KATS), designed to improve market competition, liquidity, and transparency, was introduced in 1996 (Annual Economic Report of the KSE, 1996). The KATS facilitates faster transactions than were possible under the previous manual system, allowing traders to register their bids and offers which are then matched according to the priority of prices (AlHashel, 2003) . With the introduction of the automated trading system, investor trust was gradually regained and the KSE again became active (Annual Economic Report of the KSE, 1995; International Monetary Fund, 2004). 
The boom, 2003-2005

The global financial crisis, 2008
The financial crisis that began in the United States in 2008 quickly spread to countries around the world, leaving collapsed financial markets, economic recession, rising unemployment, and personal and business bankruptcies in its wake. Various factors created the crisis, but a chief cause was the poor quality of subprime mortgages in the United States (Shiller, 2008) . Kuwait faced a difficult financial situation, as did many countries around the world (Al-Mutawaa, 2009). The KSE index experienced large losses relative to some of the leading stock markets 1 . That the crisis affected Kuwait, a small country with no outstanding debt, to the same extent as many larger countries with more debt, surprised many (Al-Mutawaa, 2009). This disproportionately large response in the Kuwaiti economy can be attributed to four main factors: strong negative investor sentiment on the KSE; a rapid decrease in the value of listed investments; lower oil prices and the large exposures of some Kuwaiti financial institutions to poorly performing foreign investments (Al-Mutawaa, 2009). Moosa (2010) is less surprised by the impact of the crisis on the KSE. He shows that the level of integration of the KSE with US markets is not high and argues that Gulf Co-operative Council (GCC) stock markets (including Kuwaiti) were subject domestic factors that were major contributors to the severity of the stock market response.
In response, Kuwaiti government regulators and financial institutions joined forces to take actions to support the economy. The Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK), for example, lowered interest rates on loans and directed banks to increase their capital to enhance the stability of the banking sector (AlMutawaa, 2009 Report, 2008) . This action set a striking precedent for the KSE. Trading had not been suspended even during the worst days of Al-Manakh crisis. Many financial analysts considered that the decision to suspend trading was ill conceived and revealed the Kuwaiti regulators' inability to cope with the crisis. They argued that market forces should be allowed to prevail even when resultant clearing prices are extreme and that the losses the Kuwaiti market incurred were no different than those sustained by other markets around the world (Al-Shal Report, 2008) . They further contended that a decision to suspend market transactions should be treated as a matter of national security, not jurisprudence (AlShal Report, 2008) .
Kuwait was the last of the GCC countries to establish a Capital Market Authority (CMA) when the Kuwaiti Parliament enacted the Capital Market Law in February 2010 (Eiman 2010 The prospectus must also include general information about the company, the history of the company and its affiliates for the last five years, descriptions of company property, the legal status of any cases filed by or against the company and information on the company's shares and shareholders. (KSE, 2010c).
Regulation And Supervision
The capital market in Kuwait is regulated and supervised by three enforcement bodies: the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MoCI), the KSE Market Committee and the Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK). The role of each of these institutions, with respect to equities, is discussed in this section.
The MoCI is responsible for the licensing of market intermediaries and for the regulation and supervision of the primary market. More specifically, the ministry oversees Market Committee decisions, such as listing new companies, listing terms and conditions, and company mergers (Al-Jarrah, 2008; Oxford Business Group, 2006b).
The Market Committee supervises the management of KSE and is responsible for setting the general rules and policies for the exchange. Article No. 5 (1983) stipulates that the Market Committee must be organized under the chairmanship of the MoCI. Internal rules and regulations on matters including the structure of the stock exchange, financial regulations, registrations, and KSE membership are the domain of the Market Committee. It is also responsible for issues relating to KSE dealings, securities, registration of stockbrokers and applications for listing including the inspection of applicant company financial statements. Since its inception, the Committee has actively issued resolutions regulating the market. Committee had not been granted the requisite power and responsibility to act as an independent regulatory agency and to oversee the development of a securities market that is efficient, fair, and transparent. It was, therefore, recommended that the Market Committee should be separated from the KSE and operate with its own resources, staff, and authority (Oxford Business Group, 2006b).
Conflict among agencies regulating the KSE is institutionalised by Article No.5 of the Ameri Decree (1983) . This article declares that "the Stock Exchange shall be managed by a committee, to be constituted under the Chairmanship of the Minister of Commerce and Industry." While this legislation was 6 Of the 185 KSE listed companies as at March 2010, 9 were banks and 49 were investment companies.
proposed to better organize the KSE it effectively weakened oversight and illustrates the divergence between the technical and the political functions of the Minister of the MoCI (Al-Jarrah, 2008). Further conflict is found in the Market Committee's responsibility to regulate and supervise brokerage firms at the KSE while the MoCI is responsible for licensing the brokers (International Monetary Fund, 2004; Oxford Business Group, 2006b).
As the chief clearing and settlement institution, the KCC works under the umbrella of the KSE. Meanwhile, the KCC also operates as the securities depository and registry. These two functions should be separated (International Monetary Fund, 2004) . In most other exchanges, securities must be deposited with the clearing and settlement institution, while the cash transfer must be made directly through financial institutions (Kuwait Transparency Association Report, 2006) . Therefore, it is inappropriate for the KCC to act as an investment custodian for stock while holding the settlement cash. Moreover, the KSE owns 27.5% of the KCC (Kuwait Transparency Association Report, 2006) . This level of ownership has the capacity to bias KCC decisions and demonstrates that the KCC does not have the requisite independence to duly fulfil its tasks (Kuwait Transparency Association Report, 2006) .
In brief, Kuwait's system is unique and eccentric compared to other regulatory systems for stock markets (Kuwait Transparency Association Report, 2006) . Most other stock markets have a Capital Market Authority, which has the executive ability to meet its responsibilities and the full powers to develop and regulate the market. The establishment of the CMA may achieve strengthening of the securities regulatory framework for the KSE to international standards. The next section documents the historical development of the listing requirements of the KSE and their evolution.
Evolution of the listing requirements
This section presents an overview of the legislation and regulations specifically relevant to the official and parallel markets over the period from 1983 to 2010. This period captures two critical developments -the Ameri Decree in 1983 which reorganised the KSE following the Al-Manakh crisis and the legislation that enables the establishment of the Capital Market Authority in 2011.
Article No.6, item No.3, of the Ameri Decree (1983) stipulates that the "Market Committee is responsible for setting the general rules and policies for the KSE; in particular it shall set the rules and procedures for enrolling brokers and listing shares of Joint stock companies and any other securities in the market." Market entrance guidelines for both the official and parallel markets are set by the Market Committee. Activity on the parallel market has decreased substantially since the Al-Manakh crisis discussed earlier. In December 2011, only 14 companies are listed on the parallel market compared with 216 on the official market. Listing regulations for the official market are discussed in section 4.1.1 and those for the parallel market follow in 4.1.2.
Listing Requirements for the Official Market
Resolution No. 1 (1984) was the first following the reorganization of the KSE in 1983. It instituted the listing requirements and it provided for their enforcement in the Official Market. Consisting of only four articles, it required that a company seeking listing on the KSE have a minimum paid-in capital of KD 5 million, have been established for at least three years prior to listing and have obtained a profit of at least 5% 7 over these three years. In addition, it empowered the Market Committee to exempt some companies from the listing requirements based on the nature of their activities and purposes. This legislation instituted paid-in capital, minim firm age and a profit requirement as the foundations for KSE listing requirements. The provision of a prospectus (including the company's history and financial status duly authorized by the company's management and external auditor) to the Market.
Committee was first required by Resolution No. 4 (1988) . Interestingly, Resolution No. 4 (1988) specifies that trading in the company's shares commence at book value. The first trading price can be different to book value if approval is provided by the Market Committee.
The discussion in the remainder of this section relates to Table 1 Following post-war reconstruction and partial economic recovery, Resolution No.1 (1997) again tightened the KSE listing requirements. One of the most important changes was the requirement for at least KD 2 million share capital and at least KD 3 million shareholders' equity. Resolution No.1 (1997) does not elaborate on the difference between 'capital' and 'shareholders' equity' so this presumably relates to an implicit requirement that listing companies have retained earnings on the balance sheet. The prelisting profit requirement was reintroduced and specified as net profit from the company's main 
The introduction of the 'strategic' shareholder and 'lock-up' requirements (Resolution No.7, 2005) followed a period of rapid growth in the number of companies listed on the KSE. 8 A strategic shareholder was defined as "the one who owns, directly or indirectly, 5% or more of a company's capital" (Resolution No.7, 2005) . The total proportion of shares held by strategic shareholders in a company seeking listing could be no less than 25% of the company's capital, whether owned by one or more strategic shareholders. Further, to protect new investors by guaranteeing the continuing participation of firm insiders (or share vendors) after going public, restrictions on shares were imposed.
Lock-ups are normally defined as agreements made by insiders of stock-issuing firms to abstain from selling shares for a specified period of time after the issue (Brau et al., 2005) . However, lock-ups in Kuwait are mandated by law, so the term 'lock-up restriction' is used here to differentiate these from the voluntary lock-up agreements prevalent in other markets. Resolution No. 7 (2005) required that all listing KSCCs retain 25% of the company's capital, specifically the strategic shareholders' shares, at the clearinghouse. Figure 1 shows the lock-up restriction periods and the proportion of strategic shareholder shares that can be offered to the market at the expiration of each.
In addition to being a listing requirement, the lock-up restriction in the Kuwaiti setting is unique in two further ways. Firstly, there are three fixed expiration periods, after which strategic shareholders are allowed to dispose of their shares. The first expiration period is after the first listed year, the second is after the second listed year and the final expiration period is after the third listed year. Secondly, a specific maximum percentage of shares can be disposed of in each period. Fifty-percent of the total restricted shares can be disposed of at the first expiration period, twenty-five percent at the second expiration period while the remaining 25 percent cannot be sold until the third expiration period. -If a closed company has increased its capital by more than 50%, one year must elapse from the date of notice in the commercial registry to listing -Companies must offer 30% of their capital for private subscription and the offer is to be managed by a specialized company that must be independent from the company seeking listing -Shareholders' equity to be not less than 115% of paid-in capital for each of the last 3 years -Strategic shareholders must hold at least 25% of the company's capital, whether owned by one or more strategic shareholders -50% of the strategic shareholder's shares must be retained for the first year after listing, 25% for the second year after listing Resolution No. 2 (2008) 10 million KD Not less than 7.5% of the weighted average of the paid-incapital for each of the last two years -If a closed company has increased its capital by more than 50%, one year must elapse from the date of notice in the commercial registry to listing -30% of a company's capital must be distributed among a sufficient number of shareholders which is specified by the Market Committee. If the percentage is not achieved, the company must offer 30% of its capital for private subscription with the offer managed by a specialized company -ratio of paid-in capital to shareholders' equity to be not less than 115% of weighted average paid-in capital for the last 2 years -25% of the company's capital must be retained at the Kuwait clearing company for two years after the day of listing . These offers are managed by specialized companies that must be independent of the listing company. In addition, shareholders' equity must be no less than 115% of the paid-in capital in each of the last three years. The most recent alteration to listing requirements occurred in 2008 with Resolution No. 2. This resolution altered the calculation of the base percentage of the total shareholders' equity and pre-listing profit from paidin capital to weighted average paid-in capital. The ratio of paid-in capital to total shareholders' equity was also adjusted to 115% of the weighted average of the paid-in capital in the past two years.
In contrast to Resolution No.1 (2007), which obligates companies seeking listing to offer 30% of their capital for private subscription, Resolution No.2 (2008) requires that 30% of the company's capital be distributed among a number of shareholders specified by the Market Committee. If this percentage is not available, the company must offer 30% of its capital for private subscription through a specialized company independent from the company seeking listing In summary, the listing requirements of the Official Market have been introduced, removed or modified frequently over relatively few years. During the period from 1984 to 2011, the capital requirement was increased, reduced and then increased again.
Lock-up restrictions were imposed then altered while the concept of strategic shareholdings was introduced then removed. The most volatile listing requirement for the KSE is for pre-listing profits. The pre-listing profit requirement started at 5% in Resolution No.1 (1984), increased to 6% in Resolution No. 4 (1988) , changed to zero in Resolution No.1 (1993), and was reintroduced at 5% in Resolution No. 1 (1997) . From 2004 until 2011, the pre-listing profit requirement remained stable at 7.5%, with the only change being to the base used for calculating the required profit percentage.
It has been argued that the organization and supervision of the KSE has been largely neglected by the relevant authorities (International Monetary Fund, 2004). Few countries in the world lack comprehensive legislation to organise their stock markets but Kuwait's law facilitating the establishment of the CMA is very recent. The regulatory climate and framework for the KSE is generally inconsistent with the conditions needed to achieve the objectives and principles advocated by the International Organization of Securities Commission (International Monetary Fund, 2004) .
Since its inception, the KSE can only be described as unstable (Aldaihani and Aldeehani, 2008) . This instability can be attributed, in part, to the process of issuing regulations in response to the political and market crises outlined in section 2 rather than the early adoption of a coherent regulatory framework for the KSE. Al-Nefeesi (2008) argues that the KSE has more gaps and deficiencies than do other emerging markets and that the KSE's development has been hampered by the lack of an appropriate legal and institutional framework. The next section will discuss and review the listing requirement of the parallel market.
Listing requirements for the parallel market
As discussed in section 2.2, the Al-Manakh market facilitated trading of GCC companies and KSCCs that did not meet the listing requirements of the official market. Following the reorganization of the KSE in 1983, the Parallel Market was established to replace the Al-Manakh market (Annual Economic Report of the KSE, 1988). GCC companies were admitted to the official market in May 1989 when it was opened to investors who were citizens of the GCC. Crosslisting of GCC companies was also permitted from this time (Annual Economic Report of the KSE, 1988). Following a brief closure, the market was reopened in 1989 with a new set of listing requirements that permitted GCC and Kuwaiti companies that did not meet the requirements of the official market to trade (Annual Economic Report of the KSE, 1989).
Resolution No. 6 (1989) included the requirement for a minimum paid-in-capital of KD 1 million to trade on the parallel market compared to KD 5 million on the official market. The amount of historical financial information was also lower with two audited annual financial reports required prior to listing whereas three were required for the official market. While there was a 6% pre-listing profit requirement for listing on the official market, there was no profitability requirement for the parallel market.
In 1993, the Market Committee again combined the parallel and official markets with a single set of listing requirements (Resolution No.1, 1993 34, 2000) . As a result, the parallel market contains higher-risk companies than does the official market (Al-Nefeesi, 2008). At present, the parallel market is best described as a transitory market where companies can list relatively easily prior to transferring to the official market. -Minimum of 50 shareholders -If a closed company has increased its capital by more than 50%, one year must pass from the date of notice in the commercial registry until listing -Non-Kuwaiti companies must be listed on their own domestic exchanges -Strategic shareholders must hold at least 25% of the company's capital, whether owned by one or more strategic shareholder -50% of the strategic shareholders' shares cannot be sold in the first year of listing, 25% during the second year of listing -If a closed company has changed its legal structure, a period of three years must pass from the date of notice in the commercial registry before listing 
Financial reporting standards and monitoring compliance
Kuwait is considered a pioneer not only among the GCC members, 9 but also globally for its adoption of IFRS in 1991 (Al-Shammari et al., 2008) . Prior to the adoption of IFRS, however, the accounting standards used in Kuwait were most frequently based on those from the United States, members of the European Union, or other Arab countries (Elshamy and AlQenae, 2005; Shuaib, 1978; Shuaib, 1998) . The accounting and disclosure practices chosen by companies varied widely, and the financial information disclosed was quite limited. Further, it was difficult to ascertain which accounting standards were being used by Kuwaiti companies (Al-Bannay, 2002). The lack of uniformity in the application of accounting standards made comparability between the accounts of companies difficult (Elshamy and AlQenae, 2005). The Surveillance Department of the KSE is also legally responsible for monitoring the compliance of listed companies with IFRS. Unlike the Control Department, the Surveillance Department staff of the KSE are technically qualified and monitor compliance with a checklist to ensure all required disclosures are made (Al-Shammari et al., 2007) . Listed companies must submit their audited financial statements to the MoCI and the KSE within three months of the end of the financial year (Resolution No. 16, 1987) . The requirement for quarterly financial reports was introduced in 1998. These must also be filed with the MoCI and the KSE within 45 days of the quarter closing date (Al-Wazzan, 2006).
In general, the MoCI and the KSE are considered separate agencies. Each has its own procedures for determining compliance with IFRS. However, there is a lack of coordination between the two agencies and different enforcement mechanisms are applied by each ( Al-Shammari et al., 2008).
Auditing standards
No uniform body of regulated or even generally accepted auditing standards were used in Kuwait prior to 1998 (Shuaib, 1998) . Most auditors voluntarily used the International Standards of Audit (ISAs), but there was no legal requirement to do so (Listing Consultants, Personal Communication, May 27, 2009). Some accounting firms based their audits on U.S. and U.K. standards while others did not appear to follow any particular standards. In some cases, financial statements were certified without any effective auditing (Shuaib, 1978; Shuaib, 1998 
Auditor practice
Consistent with regulation in most markets, the Company Commercial Law (1960) required that listed companies be audited. Interestingly, Law No.51 (1994) mandated at least two auditors from separate firms serving as joint auditors for KSE listed companies. Both auditors must be independent of the company being audited and must be registered with the MoCI. Licensed auditors have been a requirement since 1981 (Law No.5). Licensed auditors are accountants who have passed the auditing practice professional examination (prepared by the MoCI in collaboration with Kuwait University), have a specified amount of audit experience, be Kuwaiti nationals and be registered with the MoCI. Registration of auditors, prior to Law No.5, required only a bachelors degree in business or, in some cases, practical experience only (Shuaib, 1978) .
Even with the two auditor requirement for listed companies, it appears that auditors will authorize financial statements that do not reflect the true position of the company and questions about auditor conflict of interest are not uncommon. The apparent lack of auditor independence was highlighted by the Kuwaiti media as one potential cause that worsened the effect of the 2008 global financial crisis in Kuwait. As one Kuwaiti analyst put it, the "financial crisis is seen everywhere but in the financial reports of the Kuwaiti companies" (Al Mohasiboon Magazine, 2009a, p. 38). While the financial reports of Kuwaiti companies indicated their strength, the companies themselves were clearly under financial pressure.
The key legislation for the regulation of auditing in Kuwait is Law No. 5 (1981) . Law No.5 addresses the general requirements for registering and practicing accounting in Kuwait, the rights and duties of a public auditor, and the penalties that auditors may incur for violation of this law. This legislation contains the conditions and procedures for auditor registration. It also forbids auditors from undertaking any additional professional activities that are incompatible with auditing duties including consultation unrelated to accounting, bookkeeping, and preparing financial statements or advertising services in a way that is incompatible with the ethics of the profession (Shuaib, 1998) . Further, an auditor cannot also be a partner, administrator, employee, or a relative to anyone in the client's company. Sanctions for violations of Law No.5 begin with a warning; proceed to prohibition from practicing auditing for a specific period of time; and end with removing the auditor's name from the registry of auditors.
Accounting profession in Kuwait
The accounting profession in Kuwait is still in the early stages of development and is far from well established (Shuaib, 1998) . The Kuwait Accountants and Auditors Association (KAAA), established in 1973, is the accountants' professional body. The KAAA is a member of the International Federation of Accountants (IFAC). This body conducts studies, prepares research reports, provides consultations, promotes the exchange of experience, supports the development of members' expertise, widens the practical background of those working in the field of accounting, and helps regulate auditors' qualification exams (Kuwait Accountants and Auditors Association, 2010a). It does not, however, have the power to certify accountants and auditors or to set accounting and auditing standards (Al-Bannay, 2002; Alanezi, 2006; Shuaib, 1998) . The KAAA has been criticized for its inability to set accounting standards, its inefficiency, and its slow progress as an accounting association (Shuaib, 1998) .
To increase the effectiveness of the KAAA, Ministerial Resolution No., 291, which concerns the rules of ethical conduct for the auditing profession, was issued in 2006. This resolution charges the KAAA with monitoring the implementation of, and compliance with, ethical rules of conduct for accountants issued by the IFAC. It also gives the KAAA the right to investigate any violation of these rules of conduct and to report the complaint to the Minister of MoCI.
How effective the accounting profession has been with respect to the application of standards and the auditing of accounts is an open question. There have been numerous incidents where KSE-listed companies "bent" their application of required accounting principles to serve their own interests rather than those of stakeholders (Al-Bassam, 2006; Alanezi, 2006 Fund, 2004) . They question the usefulness of the accounting information that KSE-listed companies provide investors and traders given relatively low levels of disclosure, a lack of reliability and the inadequate accounting expertise of preparers.
Implications for Research
The institutional setting in Kuwait has a number of implications for capital market based research. The regulatory framework and the types of investors who participate in the market result in informational inefficiency. Many theories in accounting and finance include the impact of variables on firm value and use price as the proxy for value. The validity of price as a proxy in this context relies on how much information is impounded in price and the speed at which this process occurs. While it is reasonable to assume that the trades of informed investors are responsible for setting security prices in developed markets, the profile of investors participating in the KSE provides an interesting context for identifying the factors that affect price setting when less sophisticated investors have a substantial role in the process. Small IPO sample sizes and weak form efficiency preclude typical underpricing studies. However, the listing requirements for the KSE provide several interesting research opportunities. These are discussed in the remainder of the paper.
Informational efficiency on the KSE
Antoniou et al. (1997) argue that the tests for market efficiency developed for highly liquid markets with strong participation by informed investors accessing frequent and reliable disclosures are not appropriate in the emerging market context. Investors in emerging markets may not meet the assumptions of rationality and risk aversion that underlie the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) and, therefore, non-linear models of testing for efficiency are more appropriate for emerging markets (Antoniou et al., 1997) . While a number of studies show mixed results using linear tests of informational efficiency on the KSE, these will not be discussed here. Hassan et al. (2003) use a non-linear approach and report that the KSE does not achieve the weakform level of market efficiency. Therefore, the history of past prices for a stock is not fully reflected in the current price. Hassan et al. (2003) do, however, note that efficiency improves in the latter part of the 1990s. Also employing a non-linear approach, Abdmoulah (2010) examines changes to the level of efficiency over time and concludes that the KSE is generally weak-form inefficient but that the level of efficiency varies across the sample period. He contends that this variability in efficiency levels indicates that regulatory changes in Kuwait have not resulted in greater market efficiency (Abdmoulah, 2010) .
Research into the informational efficiency of the KSE indicates that, at best, the market is weak form efficient but may be weak form inefficient in different sample periods. Caution is advised for testing theories and models that require the assumption of an efficient market. For a security price to reflect the underlying value of the company, price must incorporate relevant information about the performance of the company and the market's assessment of prospects for future performance.
Share price and company value
A second requirement needed to justify the assumption that price is an unbiased representation of company value is that of insignificant arbitrage costs (Lee et al., 1999 (Miller, 1977) . This argument sits nicely with the KSE's history of speculative booms and busts. Stiglitz (1989) advocates taxes to reduce speculative trading in stock markets and in markets (such as Australia) where capital gains tax is levied on stock market investments, a concessional rate is applied to investments held for more than one year. Kuwaiti investors do not pay tax (Global Consultants 2006) and this institutional feature may contribute to the level of speculation in the stock market.
The lack of effective arbitrage mechanisms combined with the relatively low levels of publicly available information (discussed in section 6.2) indicates that results from value relevance studies should be interpreted with caution. The impact of earnings management or accounting policy choice on price or return, for example, implicitly assumes that price reflects value. This assumption cannot be justified unless the market is at least semi-strong form efficient and the KSE has a way to go before this level of efficiency can be achieved. Bley and Chen (2006) Shammari et al., 2008) . Further, the majority of traders (over 60%) on the KSE are individuals rather than institutional investors (Abdmoulah, 2010) . Individual traders tend to be less informed, more subject to behavioural biases and face higher transaction costs (Masih et al., 2010 (Nasser et al., 2003) . They argue that the importance of rumour can be attributed, in part, to the fact that brokers and institutional investors spend their working days in the exchange building.
Investor participation
The capacity for market manipulation is enhanced where rumours are regarded as a primary source of information. Both market manipulation and insider trading are serious problems on the KSE (International Monetary Fund, 2004 ). In Kuwait, Board members cannot be held accountable for selectively 'sharing' confidential information which has the capacity to affect share prices and trading volume (Kuwait Transparency Association Report, 2006) . Foreign investors will not find the KSE an attractive opportunity for diversification if their investment is likely to result in a transfer of their wealth to corporate insiders. The number of informed investors is, therefore, constrained by the characteristics of the KSE.
The KSE provides an excellent context for testing functional fixation on accounting information releases (c.f. Kaplan and Roll, 1972; Hand, 1990 ). We would expect that a large pool of relatively unsophisticated investors using accounting information would be fooled by cosmetic changes in the financial statements. The importance of rumour as source of information, however, provides a potentially confounding variable if a negative (or positive) rumour is circulating when a profit increasing (decreasing) accounting change is announced. A mixed methods approach using quantitative analysis of stock prices and accounting announcements and qualitative analysis with brokers at the exchange could resolve the issue.
Information availability
Non-disclosure is considered a key deficiency of the KSE. To provide transparency for stakeholders, information that affects the financial position of a company must be disclosed through appropriate official and legal channels then be released to the market in a timely fashion. While disclosure of legal disputes, for example, is mandated for KSE listed companies it has become standard practice for the KSE regulators and other stakeholders to read such information in the media prior to its official disclosed (Kuwait Transparency Association Report, 2006 Investors were astonished when the verdict from the case was published in newspapers several weeks later. MTC shares were not subject to a trading halt and ensuing trades allowed insiders to profit from trading on the undisclosed information.
Without the enforcement of continuous disclosure requirements for the KSE, researchers will experience difficulty determining when specific pieces of information became available to market participants. This feature has serious implications for research questions that are typically answered with an events study methodology -determination of 'event' dates would necessarily be arbitrary. While the KSE has embraced an electronic trading system, the electronic dissemination of information to market participants lags well behind that observed in developed markets. Announcements arising from continuous disclosure requirements are released on the KSE announcement board for the benefit of investors in the exchange building but are not stored on the KSE website.
The KSE began provide annual reports for listed companies electronically in 2008. Prior to this date, the majority of annual reports were available only in hardcopy and had limited distribution. The sampling timeframe for value relevance research would necessarily be constrained to the post 2008 period. It would require a heroic leap of faith to assume that information in the financial statements had been 'instantaneously' available to the market prior to 2008. However, Kuwaiti companies willingly supply annual reports when requested (Nasser et al., 2003; Al-Shammari and Al-Sultan, 2010).
Listing companies
As discussed in section 3, the majority of new listings on the KSE are KSCCs that do not list to raise new capital and shares are offered at book value or 'other approved' value. Therefore, there is little capacity for IPO underpricing studies given the very small sample sizes. Listing companies make hard copy prospectuses available in the exchange on listing day. Prospective investors wishing to purchase shares on the first trading day would be subject to extreme information asymmetry as they would have very limited time to process the prospectus information. In addition, the somewhat arbitrary nature of the application of listing requirements was flagged as a major issue in the Kuwait Transparency Association Report (2006) . The Market Committee has approved companies that do not meet the listing requirements for admission and it is difficult to see how the prospective investors could identify such occurrences given the short time they have to analyse prospectus data for trading on listing day.
The two auditor requirement of Law No.51 (1981) applies only to the financial statements of listed companies, not to those seeking admission to the list. Thus, for the historical financial statements presented in prospectuses, it would be prudent to spend more rather than less time analysing this information. By implication, the two auditor requirement suggests that a single auditor is insufficient in the Kuwaiti context. This feature casts doubt on the usefulness of pre-listing financial statements and provides scope for further research.
The introduction of lock-up restrictions and changes to these outlined in section 4.1.1 provide an exciting opportunity for listing company research in Kuwait. While extant research indicates weak-form inefficiency on the KSE, investigation of trading volumes at lock-up expiration may provide insights for the use of signalling by founders in the postlisting period. The frequent changes to the pre-listing profit and capital requirements provide opportunities for research to test the efficacy of these regulations. One interesting empirical question would be 'do listing companies that meet the profit requirements in periods when these are more stringent perform better in the long run?'
Incoherent regulatory framework
The Kuwaiti regulators continue to promulgate regulations that do not meet the standard required for ISOCO membership (Bouresli, 2009 ). The Market Committee, MoCI, and CBK have issued a large number of regulations over the last three decades and these are difficult to track. Although the KSE website includes some regulations, administrative decisions, and guidelines, investors and researchers will have difficulty grasping the implications of these brief publications which are not clearly explained. This lack of clarity became painfully clear to the authors of this paper as we tried to collate and interpret the regulations governing the KSE across time. Therefore, we expect the summary of regulations provided in this paper will ease the path for those interested in capital market research in the Kuwaiti context.
In conclusion, theories based on the efficient markets hypothesis will be less able to explain changes in share prices in the Kuwaiti setting. While this constrains the application of some theories, institutional features offer opportunities for research that could not be conducted in other markets. The importance of individual investors in price setting and the information they can access when making investment decisions suggests tests of behavioural theories as a potentially fruitful area for future research using KSE data.
